The Standard We Set: Trust, Power, and the Quiet Politics of Cryptographic Standards

Reading Time: 8 minutes

Category: Post-Quantum Cryptography

Author: Derk Bell, Jeroen Scheerder

Summary

Digital security rests on cryptographic standards, the invisible agreements that define who and what can be trusted online. Yet behind these technical frameworks lie institutional decisions, economic dependencies, and geopolitical considerations.

This article examines how institutions like NIST shape the global security landscape, why concentrated trust can create systemic risk, and how principles such as transparency, agility, and pluralism can lead to more resilient digital ecosystems.

Not a critique of authority, but an appeal for verifiable trust. Trust that can be examined, tested, and improved.

Trust as Invisible Infrastructure

Imagine standing at passport control in an international airport. You hand over a document built on agreements you never signed, validated by organisations you’ve never met, encrypted by algorithms you didn’t choose. The border guard scans it, nods, and waves you through.

That seamless moment isn’t magic, it’s the product of global coordination, powered by cryptographic standards. These standards determine who counts as trustworthy, what counts as secure, and whose signature is valid. But who decides those rules?

Trust in cryptography is not purely mathematical. It’s governed through institutions, processes, and policy choices. And those choices shape the balance between security, sovereignty, and resilience

Standards bodies such as NIST, ETSI, and ISO hold significant influence over the algorithms and protocols embedded in our browsers, devices, and compliance frameworks. Their approvals shape what developers, governments, and vendors can practically use.

This influence isn’t inherently problematic, it enables global interoperability and consistency, but it also introduces a structural dependency. When one organisation defines much of what is considered “secure,” its decisions have far-reaching consequences.

Centralised trust accelerates adoption, but it can also centralise failure. When oversight is limited or decision-making opaque, even well-intentioned processes can become fragile.

No institution has shaped modern cryptography more than the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). From hash functions to post-quantum algorithms, NIST’s recommendations define what much of the world adopts.

Its authority stems not only from technical expertise but also from regulatory gravity, federal procurement requirements, FIPS compliance, and vendor defaults all orbit around NIST standards.

The Dual_EC_DRBG case illustrates both the value and the vulnerability of this system. The algorithm, standardised in the early 2000s, was later found to be weak and potentially susceptible to exploitation. When documents suggested intelligence-agency involvement, it revealed how technical processes can become entangled with external interests.

This was not evidence of malice, but of how institutional incentives, national security, interoperability, and legacy reliance, can sometimes misalign with global resilience. The episode reinforced a key lesson: transparency is not optional when trust is at stake.

Even when weaknesses are discovered, outdated cryptographic standards often persist for years. Algorithms like SHA-1 and RC4 remained widely deployed long after their vulnerabilities were proven. This persistence isn’t negligence, it’s the result of complexity.

Cryptography is embedded in hardware, protocols, and policy. Updating a standard can mean reconfiguring thousands of interconnected systems. In some cases, such as cable modems with hardcoded certificates, change is almost logistically impossible.

As a result, standards designed to ensure security can become long-term risk factors when they fail to evolve quickly enough. Resilient standards must be designed for change.

The term open standard suggests transparency and inclusivity, but the reality is often more constrained. Participation in standardisation processes requires time, funding, and technical access, resources available mainly to governments, large corporations, and well-funded labs.

Academic researchers and smaller stakeholders may contribute proposals, but the influence of institutional sponsors often determines which ideas advance. Even in “open” systems, decisions can occur behind closed doors or through opaque consensus.

True openness isn’t about publishing a PDF. It’s about verifiable decision-making, where rationale, parameters, and trade-offs are visible and auditable.

Models like the IETF’s Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) demonstrate that open discussion and documented critique can strengthen trust, even when debates are messy. Transparency is not just about documentation, it’s about process and participation.

How do we build cryptographic systems that can truly be trusted?

Not by replacing one authority with another, but by designing systems that are transparent, adaptable, and resistant to single points of failure.

1. Transparency

Publish parameters, document design decisions, and make assumptions explicit. Security through obscurity doesn’t just fail, it invites exploitation.

2. agility

Systems should be able to switch or upgrade algorithms without complete redesign. Cryptographic agility prepares us not only for quantum threats but for any future algorithmic failure.

3. Defense in depth

Use multiple layers and diverse sources of trust. Hybrid encryption (classical + post-quantum) and redundant validation paths ensure that one failure doesn’t compromise the whole.

Projects such as Signal, Libsodium, and Certificate Transparency already embody these principles. They’re not flawless, but they make trust measurable and challengeable, which is precisely why they endure.

Cryptographic standards also operate in a geopolitical context.

Governments have legitimate interests in national security and sovereignty, but the same standards that protect citizens can also enable control or surveillance.

Balancing sovereignty and interoperability requires transparent international cooperation. When standards are globally trusted yet nationally accountable, security becomes not a contest of power, but a shared infrastructure of reliability.

Conclusion: Resilience Over Perfection

Cryptography is complex, even for experts. Most organisations rely on standards and libraries maintained by others, and rightly so. The challenge lies not in delegating trust, but in ensuring that delegation remains accountable.

The future of cryptography isn’t about perfect algorithms or unbreakable institutions. It’s about designing systems where authority can fail, and we remain safe.

Real security doesn’t come from certainty, but from adaptability.
A passport verifiable by multiple issuers.
A browser that doesn’t collapse when one certificate authority falters.
A system that evolves without burning down.

In other words,
the best standard is one you can walk away from.

Key Takeaways

  • Cryptographic standards are not neutral, they’re shaped by policy, economics, and trust.
  • Centralised authority provides consistency but creates systemic dependencies.
  • Transparency, agility, and pluralism strengthen resilience.
  • Verifiable trust is the foundation of sustainable digital security.

FAQ

What is the main argument of the article?

Cryptographic standards reflect institutional choices as much as technical design. Durable security depends on transparency, adaptability, and plural participation.

Why is NIST so influential?

Because its standards are deeply embedded in international regulation, software, and hardware ecosystems. This influence is structural, not political, it ensures global alignment but also concentrates responsibility.

What happened in the Dual_EC_DRBG case?

A random number generator approved by NIST was later shown to have weaknesses and potential external influence. The incident underscored the need for open review and independent verification.

What is meant by “cryptographic monoculture”?

Overreliance on a single authority or algorithm. Diversity in design and governance increases resilience and reduces systemic risk.

What is “verifiable trust”?

Trust that can be demonstrated through openness, auditing, and independent scrutiny, trust built on evidence, not assumption.

What reforms are proposed?

Three principles: transparency in design, agility in algorithm management, and pluralism in governance to prevent over-centralisation.

How does this issue relate to geopolitics?

Cryptographic standards often intersect with national sovereignty and global governance. Transparent, collaborative processes help maintain both trust and accountability.

What can policymakers and developers learn?

Treat standards as evolving frameworks. Encourage open evaluation, anticipate failure, and build systems that remain secure, even when a trusted actor stumbles.